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Agriculture’s “multifunctionality” was 
discussed in two Commentator issues in 2004 (No. 
454 and No. 456). In addition to food and fiber, 
agriculture can be a source of both positive 
(“good”) and negative (“bad”) externalities and 
public goods. Examples of potential positive 
externalities and public goods from agriculture 
include: scenic landscapes, clean water, ecological 
biodiversity, wildlife, flood protection, and carbon 
sequestration. Public policy alternatives for 
encouraging the positives and discouraging the 
negatives were explained in those two previous 
Commentators. Among the alternatives discussed 
was support for environmentally friendly farming 
practices. A subset of this alternative that is gaining 
increased attention is “payments for environmental 
services” (PES). In this Commentator, I explain 
what is meant by PES and discuss some 
considerations in developing PES policies. Then I 
describe the history of two major PES schemes1 in 
the United Kingdom (UK). I also describe the latest 
developments in PES policy in England’s portion of 
the UK. 
 
Developments in agri-environmental policy in 
Europe have important implications for the on-
going development of related policies in the US 
(Dobbs and Pretty, 2004). It is critical that “lessons” 
                                                 
1 The term “scheme” is used here as do European policy 
makers, where the term is interchangeable with “program”. 
be exchanged across the Atlantic. As the US moves 
into new programs like the Conservation Security 
Program that recognize (at least implicitly) 
agriculture’s multifunctionality, we can draw on 
experiences about what worked and what did not 
work with European PES schemes. Moreover, the 
European Union (EU) and the US are watching each 
other’s PES schemes closely—as are other countries 
watching those of both the EU and the US—in the 
context of World Trade Organization negotiations 
about the acceptability of different kinds of 
payments to farmers. 
 
Considerations in developing PES policies 
Payments for environmental services represent 
attempts to have the beneficiaries of positive 
externalities and public goods from agriculture 
provide compensation to the agricultural providers, 
to assure such provisions will be initiated or 
continue. This past June, I participated in a 
workshop in Germany titled “Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES)—Methods and 
Design in Developing and Developed Countries” 
that was organized by the University of Bonn’s 
Center for Development Research and the Center 
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR); the 
latter is headquartered in Indonesia. The workshop 
included presentations of case studies of PES 
schemes from agriculture—including forestry—
from around the world. Among the case studies 
were ones from Australia, Germany, Mexico, Costa 
Rica, China, South Africa, the United States, and 
the UK (this one prepared by myself and Jules 
Pretty, of the University of Essex, in England).  
 
CIFOR’s Sven Wunder, in two papers in the 
references, has very clearly explained key 
considerations in determining the conditions under 
which PES schemes might be effective, as well as 
the most appropriate forms for such schemes under 
 
 
different conditions. I draw on these two papers in 
the remainder of this section. 
 
Wunder defines a PES scheme as one in which 
there is “a voluntary, conditional transaction with at 
least one seller, one buyer, and a well-defined 
environmental service.” “Conditionality” means 
that payments are only made—or continued—if the 
environmental service is actually delivered. Often 
the service itself can not be measured directly. 
Rather, practices are monitored which are thought 
(based on research or other evidence) to provide the 
service being paid for. Buyers are usually 
represented by some collective entity, such as a 
water utility if the service being purchased is clean 
water from farmers or foresters in a watershed. 
Sometimes non-government organizations (NGOs) 
serve as intermediaries between buyers and sellers. 
The most common purchasing entities thus far, 
however, have been government agencies, 
representing broad public interests or service users. 
Government agencies were the buyers in the UK 
cases described in the next section. 
 
PES schemes work best where the farming or 
forestry practices required to provide the desired 
environmental services are “marginally more 
profitable” than the land use which does not provide 
the services. If existing farming or forestry practices 
are far more profitable, a PES scheme may be 
prohibitively expensive. If existing practices are 
less profitable than the proposed new practices, PES 
may not be necessary. In that case, education about 
the practices that will simultaneously provide more 
private profit than formerly and provide the 
environmental service may be sufficient to induce 
adoption of the new practices. However, risk and 
other constraints also may stand in the way of 
adoption, in which case other measures instead of, 
or in addition to, PES may be needed. 
 
PES schemes in the United Kingdom 
England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland have had several major PES schemes in the 
UK since the 1980s. One of the first such schemes 
in all of the EU was the UK’s Environmentally 
Sensitive Areas (ESA) scheme. After the ESA was 
launched in 1986, it grew to cover 22 designated 
areas in England and 10 in Scotland. Eventually, 
there were 43 ESA designated areas in the UK as a 
whole. ESAs covered specified areas of designated 
high landscape or ecological value. These ESAs 
encompassed about 14 percent of the total 
agricultural land in the UK. Under the ESA system, 
farmers entered up to 10-year voluntary 
management agreements in return for annual 
payments. Annual payments to farmers under the 
England ESA schemes had grown to £53 million 
($93 million) by fiscal year 2003. There were over 
12,445 ESA agreements in England by then, 
covering over 600,000 hectares—around 60 percent 
of the eligible area. Enrolled area represented 
approximately 6 percent of England’s agricultural 
land. 
 
The Countryside Stewardship Scheme (CSS) 
was established in 1991, and has been available 
only in England for land outside ESAs. It aims to 
protect and enhance valued landscapes and habitats, 
and improve the public enjoyment of the country-
side. The scheme targets chalk grasslands, waterside 
landscapes, lowland heaths, coastal lands, uplands 
and historic landscapes, and orchards and meadows. 
Again, farmers receive payments for entering 
management agreements, usually 10 years in length. 
There were more than 16,000 CSA agreements in 
England by fiscal year 2003, covering more than a 
half million hectares of land. Annual payments had 
reached £52 million ($92 million), nearly the same 
as ESA payments. Roughly 11 percent of England’s 
agricultural land was covered by either ESA or CSS 
agreements by 2003. 
 
The UK case study paper (by myself and Jules 
Pretty) in the references contains a detailed review 
of the ESA and CSS experiences. Although the 
ESA scheme and the CSS had somewhat different 
purposes and design, their overall effects in the UK 
were similar. The payments for environmental 
services offered under these schemes were generally 
attractive to farmers in the more ‘marginal’ 
agricultural areas; the payments tended to raise and 
stabilize overall farm incomes for farmers in hill 
areas and lower-yielding arable areas. The planning 
and technical assistance offered supported the 
achievement of stewardship goals. However, in the 
more productive arable areas, it was difficult for the 
stewardship payments offered under the ESA 
scheme and the CSS to compete with the income 
support and risk-reducing policies of the EU’s 
 
 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Just as in the 
US Midwest, it is difficult to draw farmers away 
from systems that involve only a few crops, 
relatively routine operations, and substantial 
government payments. The fossil fuel and 
agrochemical-based technologies and large-scale 
agricultural structure that have evolved over the last 
50 years also inhibit a return to more diverse and 
management-intensive farming systems. There also 
is too little social capital to adequately support 
movement to more complex, integrated farming 
systems. However, necessary networks, marketing 
institutions, and support groups are beginning to 
take shape.  
 
Recent policy developments in England 
Agri-environmental policy in the UK, as 
throughout the EU, is being influenced by the CAP 
reforms of 2003. These reforms have moved Pillar I 
(production) supports to a much more “decoupled” 
basis. Starting in 2005, most Pillar I subsidies are 
being moved to a new single payment, though 
member states have some latitude to only partially 
decouple—allowing some subsidies to continue 
being paid on a headage or hectareage basis. The 
new single farm payments are being determined 
largely on historical payment bases. Although EU 
farmers are gaining more flexibility to respond to 
market signals under this more decoupled payment 
approach, they will be subject to more 
comprehensive environmental cross-compliance 
provisions than in the past. The application deadline 
for farmers in England to establish eligibility for 
these single farm payments in 2005 and in the 
future was mid-May of this year.  
 
The greater decoupling under Pillar I should 
help mitigate some of the disincentives for farmers 
to enroll in the higher tiers of PES programs. 
Overall, one would expect UK agricultural 
production to become more extensive, with lower 
applications of chemical inputs, and some 
reductions in overall levels of commodity 
production. However, as always, adjustments will 
involve a complex set of interactions, and impacts 
on the crops sectors could turn out to be more 
modest than some expect, and some impacts on the 
environment could actually turn out to be negative. 
For example, decoupling could lead to greater 
specialization in the cereals sector, leading to even 
less biodiversity. Nevertheless, my view is that 
greater decoupling offers real opportunities for PES 
and other agri-environmental programs to 
contribute more effectively to environmental 
enhancement and sustainability.  
 
Concurrent with the consolidation of payments 
under Pillar I of the CAP, major changes are being 
made in England’s PES schemes under Pillar II 
(rural development and environmental objectives).2 
The 2003 mid-term review of the CAP has been 
implemented in England with the establishment of 
three new PES schemes as of March 2005—Entry 
Level Stewardship, Organic Entry Level 
Stewardship, and Higher Level Stewardship. With 
the introduction of these schemes, the CSS and the 
ESA scheme—for the past 15-20 years the core 
programs, along with support for organic 
agriculture, of agri-environmental policy in 
England—have been closed to new applicants.  
 
The aim of the Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) 
scheme, which is open to all who farm their land 
‘conventionally’, is to encourage farmers to deliver 
simple environmental management in addition to 
cross-compliance requirements. This management 
focuses on improved water quality, reduced soil 
erosion, improved conditions for farm wildlife, 
maintenance and enhancement of landscape 
character, and protection of historic features. 
Farmers have to complete a plan of the farm 
showing the main environmental features, called the 
Farm Environmental Record (FER), and select 
options from a menu of measures that are rated with 
points. At least 30 points per hectare are required 
over the whole farm to qualify for the £30 per 
hectare ($21 per acre) payments. The application is 
for a 5-year term. 
 
There remain complex relationships with the 
CSS and ESAs. Where a CSS measure covers a 
whole field, it has to be excluded from the ELS. 
Land in ESAs is excluded from the ELS, and land 
cannot count towards the ELS if it is part of an 
English Nature management agreement.  
                                                 
2 Under the devolution of powers that has been underway for 
some time in the UK, agri-environmental policies (as with 
various other policies) often differ among the governmental 
units of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Here, 
reference is only to England. 
 
 
 
The compulsory construction of a FER includes 
nine elements: field boundaries, trees and woodland 
protection, historic landscape features, buffer strips, 
arable land wild bird measures, encouragement of a 
range of crop types, soil protection, lowland 
grassland management, and nutrient management 
plans.  
 
The Organic Entry Level Stewardship (OELS) 
scheme is similar to the ELS, though the applicants 
must have at least part of their land registered with 
an organic inspection body as organic or in 
conversion before application. The objectives and 
basic measures under the ELS apply equally to the 
OELS, with only the detailed management guidance 
and points awarded that differ. 
 
The Higher Level Stewardship (HLS) scheme 
has been designed to be the most demanding 
scheme. Applicants must have entered one of the 
ELS schemes, and so all the basic requirements of 
those apply. The HLS is for 10 years, though 
occasionally it could be extended to 20 years. The 
aims are wildlife conservation, maintenance and 
enhancement of landscape quality and character, 
natural resource protection, historic environment 
protection, and promotion of public access to and 
understanding of the countryside. Unlike the entry 
level schemes, the HLS is competitive and is judged 
on environmental benefit per unit of expenditure. 
The HLS is closely tied to targets set in each of the 
150 Joint Character Areas of England. 
The new combination of PES schemes in 
England appears to offer good prospects for further 
enhancing agriculture’s multifunctionalilty in a 
coordinated way that builds on experiences gained 
with the CSS, the ESA scheme, and other PES 
schemes. 
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